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A conspicuous federal presence can be detected in almost
every aspect of natural resources use and development in
the United States; from surface mining reclamation
requirements in the coal fields of Indiana to protection of
wild horses and burros on grazing ranges in Nevada to
setting the terms of timber sales in the massive federal
forest holdings in Alaska and the rest of the Pacific
Northwest.  The presence of the federal government is
also apparent in the realm of water resources, from the
TVA to Grand Coulee Dam, with Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) licensed facilities
seemingly present on nearly every flowing stream in the
country; and national water-based recreation areas
ranging from ponds the size of football fields to Lake
Powell.
But while the historical pedigree of the federal presence
on our waterways is impeccable (the Army Corps of
Engineers has existed since before the adoption of the
United States Constitution), and the acknowledged
authority of the federal government over at least
navigable waters vastly predates the New Deal and the
coming of the modern regulatory state (Gibbons v. Ogden
in 1824), one cannot fairly say that federal rules dominate
in the field of water law.
Indeed, while the United States’ interest in harbors,
canals, bridges, piers and other structures that relate to
the public ability to engage in waterborne transportation
has been a universal constant since the days of the
Revolution, its interest in water for consumptive uses
such as irrigation is only about a century old.
Hydropower regulation has been the object of federal
attention for slightly more than three quarters of a
century, and federal water quality laws are largely a
product of the last quarter century.  In this absence of any
congressional interest in establishing a legal regime for
water allocation during the decades of western expansion
in the 1800's, the States took it upon themselves to choose
which theory of water rights, riparianism or prior
appropriation, best suited their needs; a practice that
Congress did not choose to disrupt retroactively, and that
the Supreme Court approved in California Oregon Power
Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co. in 1935.  For the
most part, Congress has continued to demonstrate
considerable respect for state water law regimes, even as
different national interests have evolved.  But, as will be
discussed in the following materials, for some programs,
most notably hydroelectric power generation, the federal
government has been minimally respectful; for others,
such as the Clean Water Act, a common choice has been
to encourage “cooperative federalism”; and for yet
another program, the reclamation program, state law
(although with federal funds and management) has
played a dominant role .  Therefore, one also cannot
fairly say that for all purposes, an analysis of federal-state
relations in water will show a “consistent thread of
purposeful and continued deference to state water law by
Congress.”  (California v. United States referring to
reclamation law.)  A more apt characterization of the
situation is that it involves “a concoction of Byzantine
politics and legalistic archaeology”. (Goldberg)
THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND THE
PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
The immense variation in federal and state roles has
made preemption analysis particularly unpredictable.  For
purposes of focusing on the preemption issue, this article
assumes that in any specific case of possible friction
between the national government and state law, ample
congressional authority existed to enact the federal law.
That being the case, the Supremacy Clause provides
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
(U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2) Being the Supreme Law of
the Land, however, is not the same as being the Only Law
of the Land.  Preemption analysis is the tool developed by
the judiciary to determine the instances when state law
must yield.  The key to understanding the analysis is that
5it does not involve an examination of federal power,
which is a separate issue, but rather involves an inquiry
in to federal intent.  It is also important to understand
that not only congressional statutes, but also federal
agency regulations may preempt state law; but only if
those regulations are within the authority delegated to the
agency by the legislative branch.  One distinction that
may exist between legislative and administrative
preemption is that while it is always true that the federal
government’s intent to displace state law must be
manifestly clear, and that courts will not “lightly
presume” such a purpose, they will be even more exacting
in their search for preemptive intent in cases involving
alleged agency, versus congressional, ascendance over the
States.
PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
Occasionally, Congress is sufficiently concerned about
federal supremacy in an area that it expressly spells out
its preemptive intent on the face of the federal law.  This
is called “express preemption”; and given the historical
respect for state property law in general, and state water
law in particular, it will not often occur in the water law
arena.  The closest analogue may be in some provisions
of the Clean Water Act, where Congress dictates that
certain requirements must be met, and provides for
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) enforcement if
necessary.  Most frequently, however, the States are
allowed to have more stringent requirements (although
certain bills introduced in the 104th Congress would have
changed this).  Furthermore, in many instances under the
Clean Water Act, Congress utilized the “cooperative
federalism” model of regulation, and invited  the States
to take over certain programs.  For example, the majority
of  §402 (33 U.S.C. §1342) NPDES permit systems have
been assumed by the States.  This is a far cry from the
typical express preemption scenario where the state role
is entirely displaced.  In addition to “express
preemption”, however, there are two different kinds of
“implied preemption” analysis.  These are the “field
preemption” and the “conflict preemption” models.
In “field preemption” cases, the facts involve either a
detailed and “pervasive” federal statutory and regulatory
scheme; or a “dominant” federal interest; or both.  In
such cases, the palpable assertion of (or need for)
unimpeded federal control leads the courts to attribute to
Congress an intent to “occupy the field”, leaving no room
for state law.  “Field” preemption has occurred in such
areas as immigration policy (although not the entire law
relating to aliens); nuclear power plant safety (although
not the entire area of state tort remedies); and interstate
(although not intrastate) transportation of natural gas.
Given the lengthy history of the federal involvement in
navigation, one might think that this would qualify as an
area of “dominant” (and exclusive) federal interest.
There is, however, an almost equally  venerable historical
role assumed by the states over navigable waters that
refutes that notion.  Under the Equal Footing Doctrine,
upon statehood all of the States acquired title to the beds
and banks of navigable waterways (unless they had
previously clearly been reserved or disposed of to other
parties) (Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan).  Clearly, some
concurrent state authority over those waterways has
always been recognized; although the accompanying
federal regulatory presence has not diminished
perceptibly.  Both sovereigns play on this “field”!
Realistically, the only area in water law where “field
preemption” appears to have any role is the area of
hydroelectric power generation  (Sayles Hydro
Association v.  Maughan).  It is indisputable that the
federal government has a weighty interest in energy
issues - there is even a cabinet level position dedicated to
the area.  The TVA and the BPA are examples of federal
concentration on hydroelectric power, specifically.
Furthermore, since the passage of the Federal Power Act
in 1917, there has been a federal statutory and regulatory
(originally the Federal Power Commission and now
FERC) scheme that could legitimately be termed
“pervasive”.  Nonetheless, Congress clearly never
intended to absolutely occupy the field.  Protection for
state laws “relating to the control, appropriation, use or
distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or
other uses, or any vested right acquired therein” was
dictated by §27 of the original 1917 Act (16 U.S.C.§821).
Although this section was given what many believe to be
an unnecessarily cramped reading in two United States
Supreme Court decisions spanning four decades (First
Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power
Commission and California v. FERC); resulting in the
preservation of only “proprietary interests” created by
state laws, and not all state laws; it is still not an instance
where there is “no room”  for the States.  They may not
be able to effectively “veto” a hydropower project that has
a federal “blessing”, but they can protect property rights.
An intriguing issue for the millennium is how the First
Iowa and California v. FERC decisions will be applied to
states that treat non-consumptive, instream uses as
property rights.
Furthermore, and quite possibly more importantly, in the
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given the States a powerful tool for the protection of
instream values.  Section 303 of the Clean Water Act (33
U.S.C. §1313) requires states to adopt water quality
standards and includes an “antidegradation policy”.
Section 401 of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. §1341)
requires that applicants for federal licenses or permits for
activities that may result in discharges  into the state’s
waters shall provide the federal licensing agency with a
“certification” from the state.  The certification will set
forth those provisions necessary to assure, among many
other things, that the applicant will comply with any
“appropriate requirement of State law.”  In 1994, the
Supreme Court held that a state could include minimum
stream flows as part of their (federally required) water
quality standards, and that such minimum flow levels
qualified as an “appropriate requirement of State law”
under §401 (PUD of Jefferson County v. Washington
Department of Ecology).  Thus, the States are now
enabled under one federal statute, the Clean Water Act,
to exercise considerable authority over licensing under
another federal statute, the Federal Power Act.  Clearly,
at least part of the “field” of hydroelectric power
regulation is now shared with the States.
At last we come to “conflict” preemption, by far the most
likely model for preemption analysis in the area of water
law.  “Conflict” analysis is really a two step process.
First, one must ascertain with fair precision what the
relevant federal and state laws dictate.  This may be an
arduous process in itself, entailing an odyssey through
reams of statutes; tomes on the rules of statutory
construction; and a deluge of legislative history.  Then, as
a second step, the courts compare the federal and state
law, and set aside those aspects of the state law that
directly conflict with the federal law, as well as those that
“frustrate” the accomplishment of the objectives of
Congress.  The field is not “occupied”; state laws that are
consistent with federal programs are welcome.  Conflict
preemption cases are necessarily decided on a case by
case basis; one decision will not likely serve as very
persuasive authority in another case involving different
federal or state laws.
The reason why “conflict” preemption is the usual suspect
for preemption analysis in the water law arena is the
prevalence of what are known as “savings clauses”;
express provisions in federal statutes that dictate some
level of solicitude for state laws.  The cases have
uniformly rejected a literal reading of these savings
clauses; that is to say, the courts have not read them to
abolish outright any possibility of preemption.  One such
recent case was United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation
District, where the court held that a requirement in the
Endangered Species Act that federal agencies cooperate
with state governments did not mean that state water
rights prevailed over, or provided an exemption from, the
Act’s prohibition on the “taking” of an endangered
species. 
 The presence of a savings clause, however, is certainly
persuasive that Congress did not intend to occupy an
entire field to the total exclusion of the States.  Hence, the
emphasis in the case law has been to see exactly how the
federal rules and the state rules can coexist, if at all.  If an
irreconcilable conflict arises, however, a clearly stated
federal directive will prevail. The narrow reading of the
savings clause in the 1917 Federal Power Act has already
been described; but that constricted approach has not
been workably transposed to other scenarios, perhaps
because the highly visible and active federal role in
energy regulation finds few counterparts elsewhere.  (Or
perhaps because the hydropower cases are historic relics,
maintained for their antiquarian interest and a certain
reverence for stare decisis.)   In any case, two other
savings clauses have received considerable judicial
attention, and illustrate how the courts may attempt to
reconcile potential disagreements between federal and
state law.
Such reconciliation has occurred in interpretations of
section 101(g) of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C.
1251(g), also called the “Wallop Amendment”), largely
by avoiding dealing with the issue in a head-on fashion.
This has been possible under the facts in the cases where
§101(g) has been raised as an argument.  The section
provides that the States’ water allocation authority “shall
not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired,” and
nothing “shall be construed to supersede or abrogate
rights to quantities of water which have been established
by any state.”
It is easy to describe fact patterns where application of the
Clean Water Act could result in a direct collision with,
for instance, the amount of an appropriative water right.
(“Dilution is the Solution to Pollution...”) The litigated
cases, however, have not to date involved such fact
patterns.  In United States v. Akers, a farmer tried to use
§101(g) as support for an unpermitted filling of wetlands
to create more farm acreage.  The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals had no trouble discerning that no state water
right was involved; at most there might be an “incidental
effect” that would not implicate the Wallop Amendment.
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Circuit determined that in implementing §404 of the
Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. §1344), the Army Corps of
Engineers was required to consider impacts on
endangered species (there, how building a proposed dam
could affect downstream whooping crane habitat).
Although §101(g) indicated that the Corps should
accommodate the state’s water management, the court
held that the section could not “nullify” the clear dictates
of the Endangered Species Act.
The Supreme Court finally addressed §101 (g) in PUD#1
of Jefferson County  v. Washington Department of
Ecology, where it appeared to agree with the “incidental
effects” language of Akers (which in turn, is based on
language from a statement made by Senator Wallop in
the legislative history of §101(g)).  In short, the
“incidental effects” test focuses on whether the federal
actions under the Clean Water Act are focused on water
quality/pollution abatement (or prevention) controls.  If
so, “incidental” interferences with state water quantity
rules are tolerated.  But, in PUD#1, it was the state itself
that was curtailing a proposed project. Thus,  none of the
major §101(g) cases have yet addressed a true collision
between federal action under the Clean Water Act and an
“established” water right as such.
This is not true in the area of reclamation law, where
several landmark conflict preemption cases have been
decided, and the States have had their greatest triumph.
The relevant savings clause is §8 of the Reclamation Act
of 1902 (43 U.S.C. §§372, 383), which provides that
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or
intended to affect or to in any way interfere with the
laws of any State...relating to the control,
appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in
irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder,
and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the
provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity
with such laws...
(emphasis added)
The first major §8 case was not a victory for state law.
The federal statutes that had established and expanded
the reclamation program through the development of
massive water storage and delivery systems throughout
the West had consistently required that water deliveries
from federal projects would be limited to relatively small
tracts suitable for the family farmer.  These federal
provisions were known as the Excess Lands Laws, or
Acreage Limitation Laws, and had existed since 1902.
When larger farming operations attempted to raise
California law (which did not limit the size of holdings)
as a bar to enforcement of the federal law, the argument
was rejected by the Supreme Court in forceful terms.  The
acreage limitation was a “specific and mandatory
prerequisite laid down by the Congress as binding in the
operation of reclamation projects,” and nothing in §8
“compels the United States to deliver water on conditions
imposed by the State.” (Ivanhoe Irrigation District v.
McCracken)
Several additional cases followed the Ivanhoe decision,
upholding increasingly broader and less specific claims of
federal displacement of state law, until it appeared that
the reclamation law savings clause might be as narrowly
constricted as the clause in the Federal Power Act.  The
situation was dramatically reversed in 1978 in California
v. United States.  Rejecting a claim by the Bureau of
Reclamation that amounted to an assertion of “field
preemption” (the Bureau contended that the State of
California had no authority to place any conditions
whatsoever on a reclamation project), the Supreme Court
adopted an exceedingly strict “conflict” preemption
model of analysis that will operate most often to preserve
state water law.  Possibly because §8 explicitly provides
that the Secretary of the Interior “shall proceed in
conformity” with state laws (although the opinion does
not spell out its reasoning on this point), no place for
administrative preemption was recognized in California.
For preemption to occur under the reclamation laws, the
conflict with state laws must arise from a congressional
directive.  Furthermore, those directives must be
“explicit” and “specific”.  Otherwise, state law will apply.
Thus, unlike the case in the hydropower arena, where
state rules rarely apply (unless the state is proceeding in
conformance with its duties under the federal Clean
Water Act), in the area of reclamation law, the states play
a major role.
Even in the reclamation program, however, the
Supremacy Clause dictates that state desires will give way
to a specific directive of Congress. The ultimate power of
the federal government has not been successfully
challenged in any water case (although recent trends
indicate that Congress may need to do a better job in
making its intent to preempt more clear than it has at
times in the past).  Does this mean that the United States
has committed itself to asserting its very considerable
authority to the fullest?  For the most part the answer
seems to be “no”; albeit any ardent States’ Rights purist
would certainly disagree.  Perhaps the failure to
8“federalize” water law is due to political awareness, since
championing the assertion of central government
authority is currently not a popular position.  Perhaps it
is due to the recognition that water programs can be
enormously expensive, and that continuing to operate and
maintain the existing federal facilities is enough (and
possibly too much).  Perhaps there is some recognition of
and sensitivity to history.  Perhaps it is because when one
carries a big stick (the Supremacy Clause), one can afford
to walk and talk softly.  In any event, the current federal
approach may be exemplified by developments in
Northern California.  There are water quality and fish
and wildlife problems of staggering proportions in the
San Francisco Bay and the Sacramento/San Joaquin
Delta.  Upstream, the federal government has units of its
premier water project, the Central Valley Project; the
state also has the single largest state water project in the
nation, the California Water Project.  Although there has
been controversy aplenty, and the parties faced
considerable litigation in the 1980s and early 1990s,
Congress did not choose to shove the state aside and
dictate the measures to be taken to address the problem.
Instead, the two governments have entered in to the “Bay
Delta Agreement”.  As is frequently true with
agreements, the response elicited from many sectors
(environmentalists, farmers, municipalities, etc.) is
disappointment - agreements rarely produce clear
“winners”. But accommodation, rather than
subordination, may be the best long term relationship to
build between two sovereigns.
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